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ABSTRACT 
This article responds to the discussion, in this issue, of the articles by Judea 
Pearl and myself in the 1990 special issue on belief unctions. It also addresses 
Pearl's article directly. The interpretation of belief functions is controversial 
because the interpretation of probability is controversial. Here I summarize the 
case for my own constructive interpretation of probability, probability bounds, 
and belief unctions and explain how this constructive interpretation bears on 
many of the issues raised by the discussants. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I would like to thank everyone involved in organizing and carrying out this 
exchange. Prakash Shenoy, Gautam Biswas, and James Bezdek worked hard to 
make it possible. Judea Pearl has provided a thorough review of problems in 
interpreting and using belief functions, and the discussants have pondered 
thoughtfully both Pearl's article and my own review article. 
I have had several previous opportunities to respond to published iscussions 
of belief functions (Sharer [1-3]), but those discussions were dominated by 
critics and skeptics. It is a pleasure, therefore, to respond to an exchange in 
which most of the participants are keenly interested in developing the theory 
and application of belief functions. 
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The present discussion is primarily about how to interpret belief functions, 
and the discussants have a wide variety of views on this topic. I am somewhat 
disappointed atthis, both because I would like to see work on belief functions 
move on from interpretation to application, and also, of course, because I have 
been explaining my own views on the interpretation of belief functions for 
many years, and I had hoped to be more persuasive. Yet the diversity of views 
is understandable, for belief functions use probability, and there is no consen- 
sus on how to interpret probability. 
I fear we will not agree on the interpretation of belief functions until we 
agree on the interpretation of probability. We will not even make much 
progress in understanding each other's interpretations of belief functions until 
we have more common ground in our understanding of probability. So in this 
response to the discussion, I will explain the constructive interpretation of 
probability that I favor, and I will relate this interpretation to the views and 
concerns of Pearl and the discussants. 
After discussing the interpretation f probability, I turn to the interpretation 
of probability bounds. These too, I argue, require a constructive interpretation. 
I then turn to the interpretation f belief functions. I review what I consider the 
main canonical examples for belief functions: the partially reliable witness and 
its generalization the randomly coded message. And I relate my constructive 
approach to belief functions, based on these canonical examples, to the 
different interpretations advanced by Pearl, by Philippe Smets, and by Enrique 
Ruspini. 
I conclude by responding to Nic Wilson's comments on the Monte Carlo 
implementation f Dempster's rule, and by mentioning some references that I 
overlooked in my review article. 
2. THE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY 
Contrary to the impression that Larry Wasserman took from my review 
article, I do not want to separate frequency and belief in the interpretation of
probability. I believe that probability describes, in the first instance, a special 
and unusual situation where frequency and belief are unified. This special 
situation is the classical game of chance, involving a sequence of experiments 
(successive throws of a die or draws from a pack of cards, etc.) whose 
outcomes have known long-run frequencies. These frequencies are our only 
basis for prediction, and hence they define fair betting rates and rational 
degrees of belief, both for events involving single experiments and for events 
involving many experiments. We observe the outcomes of the experiments 
as they are performed, and the outcome of each experiment changes the 
fair betting rates and rational degrees of belief for events that involve that 
experiment. 
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Different ways of applying probability should be thought of as different ways 
of using the special situation, not simply different ways of using probability 
distributions. The most common frequentist methods use the special situation 
as a model or a standard of comparison. Bayesian and belief function methods, 
in contrast, draw an analogy between the situation of a person with given 
evidence and certain imperfect forms of the special situation. All these ways of 
using the special situation are constructive. The special situation seldom occurs 
in nature. We do not find probabilities ready-made. We construct them. 
In this section, I argue for this constructive interpretation of probability by 
reviewing the history of the debate over the roles of frequency and belief in 
probability; I explain how the orderings of events in the special situation serves 
as a protocol for new information; and I contrast frequentist and Bayesian uses 
of the special situation. I use the three prisoners problem to show how 
Bayesian arguments deal with the absence of a protocol for new information. I 
conclude the section by comparing my understanding of the Bayesian approach 
with the views of other participants in the discussion, especially Didier Dubois 
and Henri Prade, Larry Wasserman, and Judea Pearl. I hope that this will help 
us find more common ground in future discussions. 
Readers interested in a fuller account of the constructive interpretation of
probability outlined here can consult Refs. 4-7. I have discussed conditional 
probability more fully in Ref. 8, historical issues in Refs. 9 and 10. 
2.1. How to Reunify Frequency and Belief 
Probabilists have debated the competing claims of frequency and belief for 
over a hundred years. Long-run frequency and rational belief were seen as 
complementary aspects of probability during the eighteenth and early nine- 
teenth centuries, but in the mid-nineteenth century, rational belief was chal- 
lenged by empiricists who regarded it as hopelessly metaphysical. Long-run 
frequency, they felt, was the only properly empirical foundation for probability 
theory. Nineteenth-century f equentism still dominates most people's thinking 
about probability, but it has been challenged in the twentieth century by a 
resurgent subjectivism, led by Bruno de Finetti [11] and L. J. Savage [12]. The 
twentieth-century subjectivists, or Bayesians, are as empiricist as the frequen- 
tists. They share the frequentists' disdain for the alleged rational degrees of 
belief and fair betting rates of classical probability. But rather than substitute 
long-run frequency for these classical ideas, they substitute personal degrees of 
belief and personal betting rates, which they consider behaviorally defined and 
hence empirically respectable. 
Most of us are comfortable with the duality of frequency and belief in the 
fair games of chance that were the original domain of the theory of probability. 
But probabilists have always wanted to extend the scope of their theory; it was 
this ambition, together with empiricism, that tore frequency and belief apart. 
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Nineteenth-century empiricism insisted that every term of a scientific theory be 
defined in terms of observables. So in order to apply probability theory to 
domains outside games of chance, probabilists had to find observable quantities 
in those domains that could be called probabilities. In most domains, there is 
nothing that is simultaneously a frequency and a belief. But there are frequen- 
cies, and there are beliefs. It seemed necessary to make a choice. 
I do not believe that this choice is still necessary. Empiricism is still the 
dominant philosophy of science, but today's empiricism is more flexible in its 
understanding of the relation between theory and practice. We can go back to 
the original integrated picture of probability, which still describes only the 
special situation of fair games of chance, and we can think of the different uses 
of probability as different uses of this integrated picture. It can be used as a 
model, as a standard of comparison, as a tool for deliberate randomization i
experiments and surveys, or as a canonical example for arguments by analogy. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the change I am suggesting in the way we think 
about probability. Figure 1 illustrates the status quo, while Figure 2 illustrates 
the approach I advocate. 
The status quo is an agreement todisagree. The frequentists and subjectivists 
agree that their only common ground is the mathematics of probability 
distributions. Because they base their applications of probability on different 
interpretations of these distributions, their applications are incomparable. 
There is no common language in which we can assess whether an application 
using one interpretation is better or worse than an application using the other. 
Every attempt at such assessment becomes an argument about the interpreta- 
tions. As Figure 1 emphasizes, the applications are separated from each other 
by the interpretations. 
In Figure 2, in contrast, the different ways of using probability do not 
represent irreconcilable philosophies. They merely represent different ways of 
using the special situation that probability theory describes. I place both 
Bayesian and belief function arguments in the lower right-hand corner of this 
figure. They both draw analogies to the special situation. 
2.2. A Closer Look at the Special Situation 
In previous articles (especially Ref. 13), I have described the special 
situation in great detail. Without repeating that description here, i will outline 
my conclusions. 
First, the special situation ecessarily involves a sequence of events. Such a 
sequence is needed in order to talk about long-run frequency. It is also needed 
to talk about fair betting rates and rational degrees of belief. The betting rates 
are fair because they break even in the long run, and the degrees of belief are 
rational because they are fair betting rates. 
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Figure 1. The agreement todisagree. 
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Figure 2. The constructive interpretation fprobability. 
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The events to which we assign probabilities include events defined by the 
outcomes of single experiments, but they also include events that involve many 
experiments--the event hat exactly half of the first 1000 die throws will come 
up even, the event that Peter will get double sixes before Paul, and so on. All 
these probabilities are fair bering rates; if you bet at these rates, you can 
expect o break even in the long run, you cannot make money for sure, and 
you have no reasonable prospect of multiplying your initial stakes substan- 
tially. Not all these probabilities are long-run frequencies. Only the probabili- 
ties for outcomes of individual experiments (if the same experiment is repeated 
over and over) or long-run average probabilities for outcomes of successive 
experiments have a frequency interpretation. This point is very important when 
we use the special situation as a model for time series or spatial data, where 
there is no prospect of repetition of the entire process of observation, 
and hence no frequency interpretation for global probability statements 
(Matheron [14]). 
The ordering of events in the special situation justifies changes in belief. We 
learn of events as they happen--we move through the sequence of events with 
nature--and our probabilities change accordingly. The rules that determine the 
sequence in which the experiments are performed (the next experiment to be 
performed may depend on the outcomes of the preceding experiments) there- 
fore determine the possibilities for what we learn. What we learn is always an 
event; but only events that fully specify the outcomes of all the experiments up 
to some point and say nothing about the outcomes of the experiments after that 
point can play this role. We learn of such an event whenever an experiment is
performed, and we change our betting rates and our beliefs to reflect the 
outcomes specified and the long-run frequencies for the experiments that 
remain. This is justified because when we change our betting rates in this way, 
we can still expect o break even in the long run, we still cannot make money 
for sure, and so on. 
When the sequence of experiments i  thought of as a set of rules for what we 
will learn, I cail it a protocol for new information. 
2.3. Frequentist and Bayesian Probability Arguments 
Both frequentist and Bayesian probability arguments are constructive, in the 
sense that they do not find probabilities ready-made in nature. They construct 
probabilities, and the result of the construction is not independent of the 
process of construction. Like belief function arguments, they have a process- 
dependent semantics. 
The most straightforward way to use probability is to create an actual 
situation that approximates the special situation. This means creating a situa- 
tion where we know frequencies and where the things we learn are outcomes 
of planned observations or experiments. Statistical work is often thought of in 
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this way, but expert systems with large databases provide an even better 
example. If we use a large expert system repeatedly under reasonably constant 
conditions, we can build up a database that gives us frequencies for the 
population defined by these conditions. If  we have a protocol for the use of the 
system--a set of rules for the conditions under which we make various tests or 
ask various questions--then frequencies conditioned on the progress of our 
knowledge of the individual case are rational degrees of belief for that 
individual case. This way of using the special situation is usually considered a 
frequentist use of probability. I call it "modell ing" in the lower left corner of 
Figure 2. 
There are other frequentist ways of using the special situation. Most 
statistical testing uses the special situation more as a standard of comparison 
than as a model. For example, we often assess the value of a prediction 
equation derived from statistical data by comparing its performance to what we 
could expect from a similar prediction equation in an instance of the special 
situation where there is no real correlation between a predictor and what is 
predicted (Freedman and Lane [15]). Randomized experiments and sample 
surveys involve another frequentist use of the special situation (this is the 
middle circle at the bottom of Figure 2). Here we create an instance of the 
special situation by generating random numbers, and then we use the random 
numbers to plan our experiment or survey. 
Most statistical teaching is concerned with parametric estimation, where 
observations or experiments are planned but the frequencies of outcomes 
depend on unknown parameters. As we do not fully know the frequencies in 
this situation, the special situation serves as an imperfect model. The 
Neyman-Pearson theory of confidence intervals hows that the frequencies we 
do know, together with the observations, can still provide guidance about the 
values of the parameters. In many cases, the frequencies given the parameter 
values are largely hypothetical, so that they might better be called subjective 
judgments. We are really drawing an analogy between our evidence and a 
situation where we know such frequencies. Bayesians trengthen this to a fuller 
analogy with the special situation by positing frequencies for the parameter 
values as well. 
The task of artificial intelligence and the ambition of Bayesian theory both 
go beyond statistical problems. In statistical problems, we have a plan for 
observations or experiments hat defines a protocol for new information, and 
frequencies for these experiments are partially known. But in the problems of 
everyday life, we constantly encounter unexpected information--information 
for which we have no protocol and no frequency experience. How can 
Bayesian methods deal with such problems? 
Outside the realm of planned experiments and surveys, Bayesian methods 
are not really implemented by conditioning on new information as it comes 
along. The distinction between old evidence (which determines prior probabili- 
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ties) and new evidence (on which we condition) is not handed to us by nature. 
The Bayesian makes it up. The Bayesian deliberately partitions her evidence 
into a part on which she can conveniently base prior probabilities and a part 
she can conveniently use to condition these prior probabilities, or perhaps a 
part on which to base likelihoods (Shafer and Tversky [16]). This can be 
confirmed by examining almost any serious Bayesian study, where the evi- 
dence on which to base prior probabilities is searched out after the "new"  
evidence is obtained. 
The absence of a protocol for new evidence in Bayesian analyses of 
everyday evidence means that the Bayesian analogy between the evidence and 
the special situation is imperfect. But analogies are never perfect. A Bayesian's 
imperfect analogy can be persuasive if the Bayesian can convince us that her 
choice of the information on which to condition is not systematically biased, 
and if we are also willing to assume that the mechanism or people who gave 
her the information did not have any systematic bias. In order to explain this 
point, let me turn to the three prisoners puzzle. 
2.4. The Bayesian Three Prisoners Problem 
Though Pearl and several of the discussants reat he three prisoners problem 
as a puzzle about belief functions, it originated, as Ruspini, Lowrance, and 
Strat note, as a puzzle about probability (Mosteller [17]). It is one of many 
puzzles, some going back many decades, that have been used to illustrate the 
need for protocols in strict probability reasoning (Shafer [8]). In this section, I
discuss it as a probability puzzle. In Section 4.7, I will discuss it as a belief 
function puzzle. 
Art, who is a Bayesian, knows that one of the inmates in his prison has been 
singled out for execution. In fact, he knows that the unfortunate inmate is 
either himself, Bob, or Carl. He knows that one of the three will be executed 
and the other two will be released, but he does not know who will be executed 
and who will be released. He has some evidence, which he represents by 
assigning probability 1/3 to each possibility: 
P(Art  will be executed) = 1/3 
P(Bob will be executed) = 1/3 
P(Carl  will be executed) = 1/3 
The guard knows who will be executed, but he is forbidden to reveal to Art 
whether he is the one. Within this constraint, he can tell Art the name of one 
prisoner who will be released, and Art convinces him to do so. He says Carl 
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will be released. So Art revises his probabilities by conditioning, obtaining 
P(Art  will be executed ] Carl will be released) = 1/2 
P(Bob will be executed[Carl will be released) = 1/2 
P(Carl  will be executed [Carl will be released) = 0 
Had the guard said Bob will be released, Art would have revised his probabili- 
ties by conditioning on that information, obtaining 
P(Art  will be executed[Bob will be released) = 1/2 
P(Bob will be executed ]Bob will be released) = 0 
P(Carl  will be executed [Bob will be released) = 1/2 
So merely by convincing the guard to tell him the name of a prisoner who will 
be released, Art seems to have guaranteed that his probability for his own 
survival will go down from 2/3 to 1/2. This hardly seems appropriate. 
There are many ways to explain what is wrong. One way is to say that Art 
has not conditioned on all his information. He should take into account, and 
condition on, everything he knows. He should condition not on the event 
A = Carl will be released 
but on the event 
B = the guard says Carl will be released after I convince him to 
tell me the name of a prisoner who will be released, within the 
constraint that he not reveal whether I will be executed 
In order to condition on B, Art must extend his probability model so that B is 
in it. His new probabilities will depend on how he does this. 
Suppose Art extends his model as follows. First he assumes that it was a 
sure thing that he would convince the guard to tell him the name of a prisoner 
to be released, so that conditioning on B amounts to conditioning on B', 
where 
B' = the guard says Carl will be released 
Next, he assigns probabilities to B" under various hypotheses. His assumptions 
require him to assign the probabilities 
P (B '  I Cad will be executed) = 0 
P(B' IBob will be executed) = 1 
but these assumptions say nothing about how the guard will choose between 
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naming Bob and naming Carl if Art is to be executed. Suppose Art gives 
probability 1/2 to both possibilities: 
P(B" IArt will be executed) = 1/2 (1) 
Then conditioning on B' produces the probabilities 
P(Art  will be executed I a ' )  = 1/3 
P(Bob will be executed [ B') = 2/3 
The guard's testimony does not change Art's probabilities for his own survival 
after all. 
Unfortunately, Art may not have any evidence on which to base the 
probability (1). He may not have any idea how the guard would choose 
between aming Bob and naming Carl. In this case, Art has no way of making 
a good Bayesian argument. 
The primary message of this puzzle is that conditioning on new information 
is strictly legitimate within probability theory only if our probability model 
includes a protocol specifying conditions under which we will acquire different 
possible items of new information. If our model does not include a protocol for 
new information, then a policy of conditioning on any information that comes 
along leaves us open to paradox, and perhaps even to manipulation by those 
supplying the information. 
Fortunately, the constructive understanding of Bayesian arguments oftens 
the conclusion that a protocol is absolutely necessary. The imperfect analogy to 
the special situation made by a Bayesian argument can be persuasive ven if 
the process by which information is acquired or chosen as conditioning 
information is not part of the probability model, provided that the choice of 
conditioning information is not systematically biased. The guard in the three 
prisoners problem violates this assumption; he systematically supplies a subset 
B that not only always contains the truth (the name of the person to be 
executed) but also always contains Art. But it is often reasonable to hope that a 
Bayesian can avoid this kind of systematic bias when she chooses information 
on which to condition. 
I would like to be able to articulate more precisely the requirement that there 
be no systematic bias in the choice of the information B on which we 
condition. But the only obvious way to be more precise is to specify a 
probabilistic mechanism for the choice of B. (For example, we might deter- 
mine B by drawing a partition II from some probability distribution for 
partitions of 0 and letting B be the element of II that contains the truth.) And 
this would simply recreate the protocol that we have admitted oes not exist. 
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2.5. Updating and Focusing 
Didier Dubois and Henri Prade, in their contribution to the discussion, 
distinguish between "updating" and "focusing." They use this terminology 
effectively to discuss limits on conditional probability and complications that 
arise when we consider families of distributions. I prefer to avoid the term 
"updating," however, because it supports the fiction that Bayesians condition 
on information as it comes along. 
2.6. De Finetti's Foundations for Bayesian Methods 
Larry Wasserman reviews de Finetti's foundations for the Bayesian ap- 
proach to probability, and he asks, in a sympathetic way, whether analogous 
foundations are possible for belief functions. Is there a theory of "coherence" 
for belief functions? Can belief functions ubordinate the idea of frequency to 
the idea of belief as de Finetti does using the concept of exchangeability? 
Underlying these questions, I believe, is a desire to relate belief functions, 
and every other application of probability, as closely as possible to the special 
situation where frequency and belief are unified. I am sympathetic to this 
desire, and I will try to respond to it in Section 4. I must first, however, 
emphasize my opposition to de Finetti's approach to Bayesian foundations. 
Wasserman states de Finetti's coherence argument concisely. Suppose, he 
says, that I interpret P(A) as the price at which I would buy and sell tickets 
that are worth one unit if A is true and are worthless otherwise. Such offers 
can lead to a sure loss for me unless the numbers P(A) obey the rules of 
probability. So this interpretation is a justification for using the rules of 
probability: "To  be coherent, one must use probability." The betting sce- 
nario, Wasserman says, is more than just a canonical example: " I t  serves as a 
way of testing the theory of probability to see if it makes sense." 
After pondering this argument for many years, I am still unable to see in it 
more than a series of non sequiturs. Why should I set a price at which I would 
both buy and sell a ticket on A? Is it incoherent for me to demand a buy-sell 
spread? (As Wasserman mentions, allowing buy-sell spreads leads to lower 
instead of additive probabilities.) Is it incoherent for me to refuse to gamble at 
all? Or to gamble only in a situation where I know at least as much as those 
who might bet with me? Or to gamble only when I know the betting rates are 
fair? 
The betting interpretation of probability did not originate with de Finetti; it 
began with the invention of probability theory in the seventeenth century. In 
the original betting interpretation, one bought and sold a ticket to an event at a 
single price because this price was fair. One aspect of the price's fairness, first 
articulated in the eighteenth century, was the guarantee it provided of breaking 
even in the long run. De Finetti, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, wanted to 
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liberate the betting interpretation from any reliance on long-run frequency, so 
he substituted personal prices for fair prices. He demanded, with no justifica- 
tion that I have ever been able to see, that for every event a person should have 
a single price at which he or she will both buy and sell a ticket. 
De Finetti and his Bayesian followers have failed to look critically at their 
own rhetoric because they have been preoccupied with refuting the errors of 
frequentism. In order to be a useful weapon against the frequentists, the 
"coherence" argument need only make as much sense as the excessive claims 
of frequentism. Now this battle has been won, and the time has come to be 
more critical. 
My disagreement with Wasserman about de Finetti's contribution extends to 
de Finetti's theory of exchangeability, which subordinates frequency to belief. 
Wasserman sees this as a success tory; I see it as a mistake. If we do not have 
frequencies in the first place to justify the additivity of probability, then we 
cannot follow de Finetti in getting frequencies out of additivity plus exchange- 
ability. In my view, we should subordinate neither frequency nor belief to the 
other; they are equally essential aspects of the special situation. A mathemati- 
cal description of the special situation can begin with rules or assumptions 
about either aspect, but justifying these rules will then take us back to the other 
aspect. To justify fairness for betting rates and additivity for beliefs, we need 
long-run frequency. To justify our knowledge of the long run, we need odds 
and beliefs. 
These strictures on interpretation aside, I share Wasserman's curiosity about 
the possibility of extending de Finetti's mathematical results to belief func- 
tions. I have not followed up on the work I published along these lines in 1982, 
but I still consider the question intriguing. 
2.7. How Does Judea Pearl Interpret Probability? 
Although Pearl does not discuss the interpretation of probability explicitly, 
many of his comments are incompatible with my constructive interpretation. 
The most glaring point of difference between us is Pearl's ability to take the 
concept of probability for granted. He is willing to talk about he probability of 
something without first asking whether there is such a probability or by what 
argument or analogy it is to be constructed. At the end of Section 1 of his 
article, he writes that we should be more interested in "the probability that A 
is true given the evidence" than in belief function calculations of "the 
probability that the evidence implies A . "  He spends several paragraphs 
driving this point home, without stopping to consider the claim, made in 
almost every exposition of belief unctions, that "the probability that A is true 
given the evidence" sometimes simply does not exist. 
The reason for being interested in belief functions is not that we prefer them 
to direct probabilities, but that sometimes we cannot construct convincing 
direct probabilities. Nic Wilson makes this point very effectively. 
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A willingness to talk uncritically about the probability of A is common, 
especially among those uninterested in philosophical issues. But Pearl goes 
beyond the common culture to create his own philosophical vocabulary. He 
draws a novel distinction between "knowledge" and "evidence." Knowledge, 
he writes, "encodes judgments about the general tendency of things to 
happen," while evidence "summarizes the impact of that which actually 
happened" (p. 364). This distinction is designed to make the Bayesian formal- 
ism sound like common sense. Knowledge is supposed to give us prior 
probabilities, and evidence is supposed to give us likelihoods. But the distinc- 
tion is contrary to common usage and to fact. Most of my knowledge has 
nothing to do with general tendencies or probabilities (my shirt is white; I am 
in Maine; etc.), and my evidence often does involve frequencies. The distinc- 
tion is also deeply misleading. It wrongly suggests that nature tells us what 
should go into the prior probability part of a Bayesian analysis and what should 
go into the likelihood part. 
Pearl's emphasis on frequency knowledge suggests that he is primarily 
interested in frequentist rather than Bayesian applications of probability. I
applaud this interest. As I said in my review article, a few solid bits of 
frequency information are often much more useful than extensive subjective 
judgment (Dawes et al. [18]). And the further development of frequentist 
expert systems is an important area of endeavor for both AI and statistics. But I 
believe that both Bayesian and belief function arguments belong in a different 
arena. They belong in the arena of everyday and commonsense r asoning, in 
which we constantly grapple with unexpected evidence and questions for which 
we have not compiled frequency information. 
3. THE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY BOUNDS 
Much of the present discussion is concerned with whether belief functions 
express bounds on probabilities. I find this disappointing, because I gave belief 
functions their name in order to distinguish them from probability bounds, l But 
the debate goes on. Ruspini, Lowrance, and Strat, unconvinced by my 
arguments or Pearl's examples, still contend that belief function degrees of 
belief are bounds. 
1 The first published use of "belief unction" in its present meaning was in my 1976 book, A 
Mathematical Theory of Evidence [19]. The term had been used earlier, by Richard Jeffrey [20], 
and perhaps others as well, to mean a Bayesian probability function. Since I have always 
emphasized that I adopted "belief function" as a new name for Dempster's system of "lower 
probabilities" in order to forestall misinterpretation n terms of probability bounds, I am 
disconcerted byPearl's assertion that "belief unctions were first interpreted aslower and upper 
probabilities induced by a special family of probability distributions" (Pearl, 367). 
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This continuing disagreement may be due in part to the need to interpret 
probability bounds themselves. Are they bounds on frequencies or bounds on 
beliefs? How can we use them in a constructive theory of evidence? 
I begin this section by commenting on the distinction between bounds on 
distributions and families of distributions, and on the possible role of Bayesian 
conditioning in a constructive theory based on bounds or families. Then I 
discuss several distinct ways of basing a constructive theory of evidence on 
bounds or families. 
3.1. Bounds and Families 
Let me underline a point made, in different ways, by Pearl and Wasserman. 
Any family of probability distributions on a frame O determines lower bounds 
for the probabilities of subsets of O. We call this system of lower bounds the 
family's lower probability function. But several families can have the same 
lower probability function. Only one of these families, the one that includes all 
probability distributions bounded below by the lower probability function, is 
specified simply by specifying the lower probability function. Thus bounds are 
inadequate to represent families of distributions. The idea of a family of 
distributions i  more general than the idea of a lower probability function. 
The fact that bounds are less general than families does not establish the 
inadequacy of a theory of evidence based on bounds alone. Greater generality 
is not always needed, and greater epresentational power always has its price in 
computational difficulty. Is the greater epresentational power of families of 
distributions needed? Different ways of using bounds to represent 
evidence--different constructive theories that use bounds--may lead to differ- 
ent answers to this question. 
3.2. Conditioning Bounds 
A related issue is the role to be played by Bayesian conditioning. Bayesian 
conditioning cannot be applied to lower bounds, but it can be applied to the 
distributions bounded by them. I f  we have represented our evidence by a lower 
probability function and we learn that the truth is in a certain subset, then we 
can change the lower probability distribution by conditioning each distribution 
it bounds. 
As Pearl points out in Section 3.3 of his article, this procedure for 
conditioning lower probability functions is not commutative. 2 If  we use 
families of distributions as our representation f evidence, then conditioning is 
2 Pearl emphasizes the case of lower probability functions that happen to qualify mathematically 
as belief unctions. In this case, this kind of conditioning can be implemented by the formula he 
cites. 
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commutative; conditioning all the distributions in a family ~ first on B and 
then on C is the same as conditioning them all first on C and then on B. But if 
we use lower probability functions as our representation, and we think of 
conditioning the distributions bounded by a lower probability function merely 
as a background evice, then this commutativity is lost. This is because a 
second conditioning will involve, all the distributions bounded by the lower 
probability function obtained by the first conditioning, not merely the distribu- 
tions obtained by the first conditioning. If  P. is the lower probability function 
with which we begin, ~ is all the distributions bounded by P., #B is the 
family obtained by conditioning the distributions in # on B, and P*IB is the 
lower probability function for ~B, then ~B may not include all the distribu- 
tions bounded by P*IB" If  we regard P*IB as the new representation f our 
evidence, then in order to condition on another event C, we will repeat he 
whole procedure, which means conditioning all the distributions bounded by 
P*I B, not merely the ones in :~B" 
It is not clear that conditioning should be commutative. As we have seen, 
conditioning is strictly justifiable for probability only in accordance with a 
protocol that specifies the order in which information can be learned. The 
order in a protocol cannot be reversed. If  the protocol allows B to be all we 
have learned at one point and C to be all we have learned at a later point, then 
C is a subset of B. So the formal commutativity of conditioning for probability 
(and belief functions) seems more a curious accident han a basic principle. 
It is also not clear why we should condition a lower probability function by 
conditioning the distributions it bounds, or why we should condition a family 
of distributions by conditioning its individual distributions. To justify these 
procedures, we need a semantics for bounds or families. 
3.3. What Do Bounds or Families Mean? 
The unity of belief and frequency that characterizes the special situation 
described by probability theory is possible because the long-run frequencies in 
that situation are known. This unity cannot survive a generalization to bounds 
or families of distributions. If we know only bounds on probabilities, then 
the probabilities are not known frequencies. So we must choose, to some 
extent at least, between interpreting them as beliefs and interpreting them as 
frequencies. 
There are several ways of making the choice, each of which leads to a 
different interpretation of bounds on probabilities and possibly to a different 
constructive theory of evidence. Here I will sketch four possibilities: We can 
adopt a strict belief interpretation of families, we can interpret lower bounds 
directly as betting rates, we can adopt a complete frequency interpretation of
families, or we can put ourselves in the position of a partial observer of the 
special situation. 
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ISAAC LEVI'S THEORY OF CREDAL COMMITMENT One possibility is to 
abandon frequency altogether and interpret he distributions in a family as 
distributions of belief. This has been advocated most clearly by Isaac Levi 
[21]. Like de Finetti, Levi interprets a probability distribution as a commitment 
to bet. But he goes beyond de Finetti by interpreting a family of probability 
distributions as a state of indecision among such commitments. He makes 
detailed proposals for using and modifying such families in the face of new 
evidence, changes of opinion, and opportunities to seek further information or 
take practical action. 
In Levi's theory, as in de Finetti's theory, a person can choose whatever 
beliefs she wants. While this is undogmatic, it leaves us without guidance in 
using the theory to represent evidence. Levi's proposals for changing beliefs 
are more definite, but they are complex and arbitrary (Shafer [22]). This may 
be inevitable, because without the connection with frequency, the additivity of 
probability itself is arbitrary. 
BETTING RATES WITH BUY-SELL SPREAD Another possibility is to interpret 
lower probability functions merely as systems of betting rates, under a scheme 
in which bettors are permitted a buy-sell spread. Suppose, indeed, that for 
each subset A of a frame O, Betty declares the highest price she will pay for a 
ticket on A. The prices she declares for different subsets hould be related, 
because tickets on various events can sometimes to be compounded to form a 
ticket on another event. As it turns out, the prices should form a lower 
probability function for some family of distributions. We need not, however, 
attach any significance to the family. Thus this interpretation of lower prob- 
ability functions does not compel us to consider more general families of 
distributions. 
The betting interpretation of lower probability functions has been studied 
thoroughly by Peter Walley [23]. It seems incomplete, however, as a canonical 
example for a theory of evidence. Why does the person in the canonical 
example have given betting rates? What kind of evidence lies behind these 
betting rates? We need to know more about that evidence in order to draw 
convincing analogies between it and our actual evidence. Moreover, the betting 
interpretation does not impose rules for combining evidence. Walley recom- 
mends Bayesian conditioning for updating, but this seems arbitrary without an 
interpretation for the families of distributions bounded by the betting rates. 
FAMILIES OF FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS WITH BAYESIAN CONDITION- 
ING Let me turn now to the most obvious and common interpretation of 
probability bounds: There is a true frequency distribution for some phe- 
nomenon, but we do not know it exactly. We know only a family of 
distributions that contains it. We use the lower probability function of this 
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family as one expression of our beliefs. When the occasion arises, we change 
our beliefs by conditioning each distribution in the family. 
This sounds deceptively straightforward. Having grown accustomed to 
thinking about frequentist probability in terms of a mathematical distribution 
rather than in terms of the special situation, we find it natural to generalize to a 
family of distributions. Having grown accustomed to the erroneous idea that 
arbitrary conditioning is meaningful, we take it for granted that conditioning a
family is meaningful. 
Actually, it is not so easy to imagine ways of obtaining the knowledge that a 
frequency distribution is in a certain family. The obvious way to get imperfect 
knowledge about a frequency distribution is to sample from it, but sample 
information does not lead to a family of distributions. It leads to estimates, 
confidence intervals, tests, and posterior distributions. Didier Dubois and 
Henri Prade argue that set-valued statistics do lead to families of distributions 
(with lower probability functions that happen to be belief functions), but 
statisticians will ask for clarification. Does the model include rules (albeit 
unknown) for how the range of uncertainty is determined? If so, set-valued 
statistics fall in the usual domain of mathematical statistics. 
We can use families of distributions to represent vague guesses about 
frequencies, but the usefulness of this representation can be questioned. As 
critics often point out, it may be easier to make vague guesses into precise 
guesses than to make them into something equally precise and even more 
complex--a family of distributions. Often the problem with our guesses is not 
that they are too vague but that they may not be fully relevant. Pearl might be 
able to guess the rate of burglaries in Los Angeles area, but what does this tell 
him about the likelihood of a burglary of his home on this particular sunny 
afternoon? 
Even if we do have knowledge that a frequency distribution is in a certain 
family, how can we justify Bayesian conditioning of the distributions in the 
family? It is important to remember that once our knowledge has been 
divorced from the step-by-step unfolding of events, we lack the strong justifi- 
cation of conditioning that is available in the special situation. Change of belief 
in accordance with the rule of conditioning is no longer an integral part of the 
model. 
Bayesian theory gives up protocols for new information in favor of external 
judgments that the choice of information is not biased, but it retains protocols 
at least as an example--perhaps the best example--of such absence of bias. 
The fundamental point of Pearl's sandwich examples is that protocols are no 
longer a good example of absence of bias when we generalize to families of 
distributions. 
Pearl presents his sandwich principle as a criticism of belief functions, but as 
Wilson points out, the principle is also violated when we condition families of 
distributions. I agree with Wilson and Smets that the sandwich principle is 
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unconvincing as a general principle of plausible reasoning, for the very 
statement of the principle involves the concept of conditioning, and this 
concept is meaningless outside the realm of probability. Even within probabil- 
ity, the appeal of the principle is limited to the situation in which the 
probability model says that our new knowledge will be either B or not B. 
When we have such a protocol, and we know that our belief in A will go up 
either way, it seems odd that it should not be up already. But when we do not 
have such a protocol--when what we condition on is chosen from a more 
diverse list of possibilities in an unbiased way--then what would happen if we 
were to condition on B or on not B does not loom so large. 
When we generalize from a single distribution to a family of distributions, 
we generalize the idea of a protocol as well. We can longer have a complete 
probability model for new information, but we can specify a partition of the 
space (such as B or not B) and specify that our new information will be 
knowledge of which dement of the partition contains the truth. The examples 
that disturb Pearl suggest hat such generalized protocols do not ensure the 
absence of bias that can justify conditioning. This should not be surprising. 
Since the absence of bias is relative to our knowledge, making our knowledge 
more complicated may make it more difficult to be unbiased. 
PARTIAL CAUSAL MODELS If we retain the sequence of experiments that 
characterizes the special situation but drop the assumption that we observe the 
outcomes of the experiments as they are performed, then we have what is often 
called a "causal model." If we also drop the assumption that we know fully 
the frequencies of outcomes for each experiment, assuming instead that we 
know only bounds for these frequencies, then we have a "partial causal 
model." 
I am very sympathetic to the idea of a partial causal model, because it is a 
genuine generalization of the special situation, not merely a generalization of 
the idea of knowing a frequency distribution. I think that there is still work to 
be done, however, in understanding such models. We need to understand the 
extent o which the frequencies in the model can retain a belief interpretation, 
and the extent o which this can help justify the use of conditioning. 
3.4. Conclusion 
Bounds on probabilities and families of frequency distributions can be useful 
representations for evidence, but they are not as natural or ubiquitous a form of 
knowledge as Pearl suggests. 
The use of a frequency bound in a practical problem relies on the assumption 
that there is a correct frequency to bound--a correct reference class for our 
problem. This assumption is only sometimes reasonable. There may be no 
good reference class. There may be several reference classes--several different 
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ways of describing a situation--that are relevant or partially relevant. We 
cannot necessarily say that one of them is the right one. They may simply be 
competing arguments that must be weighed against each other without being 
combined into a single argument. 
Belief functions are useful when different reference classes can be seen as 
relevant to different aspects of a problem and hence can be combined. The idea 
is to treat reference classes for several different questions as independent 
arguments about a question for which we do not have a good reference class. 
4. THE INTERPRETATION OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
In this section, I compare my interpretation of belief functions with the 
interpretations proposed by Pearl, by Smets, and by Ruspini, Lowrance, and 
Strat. 
I begin by discussing the transitory nature of the compatibility relations in 
the principal canonical examples for belief functions--the witness of uncertain 
reliability and the randomly coded message. A transitory compatibility relation 
applies only to the particular case, not to all the cases in the reference class that 
defines frequencies for the background probability space. My objections to the 
proposals by Pearl and by Ruspini et al. are based on the need for such 
transitory compatibility relations. Pearl's formulation--that belief functions 
express probabilities of provability--gives the impression that compatibility 
relations are always permanent. Ruspini et al. make the compatibility rela- 
tion part of the probability model, thus reducing its transitoriness to ran- 
dom variation. This brings belief functions more firmly into the purview of 
formal probability theory, but it does so using a misleading and fictional 
superstructure. 
I also discuss conditioning and combination. Dubois and Prade, as well as 
with Ruspini et al., argue that belief functions use conditioning in the usual 
Bayesian sense, which is true. It is also true that the unbiasedness condition for 
Bayesian conditioning is a special case of the independence condition for 
Dempster's rule. The three prisoners puzzle involves essentially the same 
issues for belief functions as it does for Bayes. 
I conclude this section by discussing Wilson's alternative rationale for 
Dempster's rule, Smets's rejection of any probabilistic interpretation of belief 
functions, and Wasserman's call for an asymptotic theory for belief functions. 
4.1. The Witness's Transitory Compatibility Relation 
The witness of uncertain reliability provides a simple example of a transitory 
compatibility relation. The compatibility relation is established by what the 
witness says. The similar witnesses to whom we compare the witness in order 
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to calibrate her credibility say different things and hence establish different 
compatibility relations. Even within the reference class in which we place the 
witness, the other witnesses are saying different things. The compatibility 
relation is transitory rather than fixed relative to repeated rawing from this 
reference class. 
Recall, from my review article, the story of Betty's telling me that a tree fell 
on my car. Because I had found witnesses like Betty reliable 90% of the time 
in the past, her testimony gave me a 90 % degree of belief that a tree had fallen 
on my car. This seems reasonable to me even though none of the earlier 
witnesses ever told me that a tree fell on my car. 
Let me express the framework of the story of Betty formally, so that I can 
make my point about transitory compatibility relations in a more general way. 
My only evidence about Betty is that she was randomly chosen from a class of 
witnesses, p of whom are reliable, and 1 - p of whom are not. I represent 
this evidence by a probability space (fl, P),  where 
f~ = { reliable, unreliable } 
P(reliable) = p, and P(unreliable) = 1 - p. Betty's testimony, that a tree fell 
on my car, creates a compatibility relation between fl and O, where 
(9 = {tree fell on my car, tree didn't fall} 
This compatibility relation can be expressed by the multivalued mapping I', 
where 
I' (reliable) = {tree fell on my car} 
F (unreliable) = {tree fell on my car, tree didn't} 
The mapping F, together with the probability space (fl, P),  determines my 
belief function Bel on O. The probabilities given by P are full-fledged 
probabilities--frequencies and degrees of belief. Betty was chosen at random 
from a reference class of witnesses, so p is the frequency of reliable witnesses 
and my degree of belief that Betty is reliable. The frequency aspect of the 
interpretation is limited, however, to the reference class (f~, P).  It does not 
extend to the frame O or to the compatibility relation between fl and O. It is 
only on this particular occasion that the witness chosen at random testifies that 
a tree fell on my car and hence creates this particular compatibility relation. 
The transitoriness of the compatibility relation is essential to the way this 
canonical example is used by the constructive theory of belief functions. When 
I make judgments about the reliability of a certain item of evidence (a 
handshake, a well-kept financial edger, a vivid memory), I place this item of 
evidence in a reference class consisting of items of evidence in my past 
experience that had the same claim on my credence. The items in this reference 
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class are similar but not identical to each other. In general, they bear on many 
different questions. 
Belief functions can also be based on permanent compatibility relations, but 
transitory compatibility relations account for the most useful applications of 
belief functions. Thus the possible transitoriness of compatibility relations must 
be taken into account when we discuss the interpretation of belief functions. 
Such transitoriness limits the frequency interpretation of belief functions, and it 
therefore limits the sense in which belief functions can be said to express 
probability bounds or probabilities of provability. 
4.2. Do Belief Functions Bound Probabilities? 
Formally, any belief function Bel on a frame O is a lower probability 
function. If we let ~ be the family consisting of all probability distributions P
on O such that P(A) >_ BeI(A) for every subset A of O, then 
Bel(A)  = in f{P(A) lP~ ~} 
But what interpretation do we put on the probabilities expressed by the 
distributions in ~?  
If Bel is based on a transitory compatibility relation, then these probabilities 
are not frequencies. Of course, we can make up a new story that makes them 
frequencies. I can imagine witnesses like Betty telling me many times that a 
tree fell on my car; I can imagine different frequencies with which it is true; 
and I can assume that these frequencies are all greater than p. But if I used the 
transitory compatibility relation to model my evidence, then this new story has 
nothing to do with that evidence. 
In the absence of a frequency interpretation, what might it mean to interpret 
the probabilities expressed by the distributions in ~ as beliefs? We could 
follow Levi and say that ~ is a class of distributions of belief among which 
we are undecided. But in the absence of a connection with frequency, I see no 
reason for assuming additivity of belief, and in any case, this family of 
distributions i  superfluous to my assessment of my evidence. 
My conclusion is that in the case of a transitory compatibility relation, the 
family ~ is a purely mathematical construct, with no conceptual significance. 
4.3. Do Belief Functions Express Probability of Provability? 
Probabilities for o~ produce degrees of belief for O because 60, together with 
the compatibility relation, implies that 0 is in I'(oJ). The degree of belief 
Bel(A) is the total probability of all the o~ that together with the compatibility 
relation imply that 0 is in A. Pearl, equating this implication with logi- 
cal proof, calls Bel(A) a "probability of provability." It is "an ordinary 
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probability of a bona fide event--the existence of a logical proof for 
A"  (pp. 367-368). 
This way of talking has its uses, but I am uncomfortable with it, because it 
gives the impression that compatibility relations are always permanent. Since 
the "proof"  a transitory compatibility relation supports applies only to the 
particular case, and not to other cases in the reference class underlying the 
belief function, we are not dealing with the probability of an event, as that 
phrase is usually interpreted. The event does not happen with a certain 
frequency in the reference class. I f  Betty is a reliable witness, then her 
statement that a tree fell on my car proves that a tree fell on my car. Since 
witnesses like Betty are reliable 90% of the time, this gives me a 90% degree 
of belief that a tree fell on my car. But is this the probability of proving that a 
tree fell on my car? Will listening to such witnesses as I go through life prove 
90% of the time that a tree fell on my car? No, because (I hope) they will not 
always tell me that a tree fell on my car. 
My fear that Pearl's "probability of provability" makes the compatibi- 
lity relation seem permanent is confirmed by his article's line of reasoning. 
After emphasizing examples of compatibility relations that are permanent and 
therefore determine bounds on frequencies, Pearl concludes (p. 386) that com- 
patibility relations are representations of categorical domain knowledge-- 
representations of "stable relationships that govern entities in a domain." But 
compatibility relations need not express table relationships. They can use the 
circumstances of the particular case (what the witness said, what these account- 
ing records say, the apparent state of this bird's wings) to relate frequency 
knowledge to the question of interest. 
4.4. The Randomly Coded Message 
The canonical example of the witness of uncertain reliability is sufficient o 
calibrate simple support functions, but sometimes we want to assess more 
complex belief functions directly from evidence. We want to say that a given 
item of evidence (a measurement, anapparent erasure, a certain kind of static) 
can mean any of several things, with different probabilities. The canonical 
example of the randomly coded message generalizes the canonical example of 
the witness in order to deal with such evidence. Like the canonical example of 
the witness, it uses a transitory compatibility relation. 
Here is what I mean by a randomly coded message. We are interested in a 
question whose possible answers constitute a frame O. Betty, who knows the 
true answer, decides to tell us a subset L of O that contains it. She selects L 
arbitrarily but honestly; the true answer really is in L. She gives L to Sally, 
who sends L to us in encoded form, using a code o~ o, so that we actually 
receive M = O~o(L ). Sally selects oJ o randomly, independently of the message 
L, from a set fl of codes, following a probability distribution P on ft. Sally 
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does not tell us w o, but we know fl and P. For simplicity, suppose we can 
decode M using any code w in t ,  and suppose the result, w- l (M) ,  is always 
a nonempty subset of O. Then M determines a compatibility relation between 
fi and O that can be expressed by the multivalued mapping r that maps each 
code w in fl to the subset w- i (M)  of O. This, together with P,  determines a 
belief function Bel on O. Our degree of belief in A, 
Bel(A)  = P({o~l ¢0-1(m) c_A}) 
is the total probability of the codes according to which the message would 
allow us to conclude that the true answer is in A. 
The compatibility relation here depends on M, the encoded message, which 
depends in turn on L, the true message. Betty chooses L arbitrarily, and she 
varies L arbitrarily when the story is repeated. Thus the compatibility relation 
is again transitory. Here, as in the case of the witness, this transitoriness i
appropriate for applications. The probabilities for the codes correspond to the 
frequencies with which similar evidence in the past should have been inter- 
preted in various ways. Since the details of the past instances vary, the 
implications of the different interpretations vary. 
4.5. Permanent Compatibility Relations 
Some compatibility relations are permanent, in the sense that they do 
express table relationships. 
The simplest example of a permanent compatibility relation arises when 
known frequencies are adopted irectly as a belief function. We can think of 
this as the case where 0 and O are equal, and r ,  rather than being 
multivalued, is simply the identity mapping from f~ to O, so that Bel = P. In 
this case, the probabilities determine the truth about the question that interests 
us, not just the meaning of the evidence. 
We should not, of course, automatically interpret in this way any belief 
function that happens to be additive. If the different codes in the story of the 
randomly coded message all produce incompatible messages when applied to 
the message received, then the belief function obtained will be additive, even 
though the compatibility relation is transitory. As Wilson reminds us, additive 
belief functions can also result from infinite weights of evidence. 
Permanent compatibility relations can also produce nonadditive belief func- 
tions. This is the case where random drawing 60 from fl partly determines the 
true value of O. The role of permanent compatibility relations in the theory of 
belief functions is clearly limited, however. We cannot randomly determine the 
same O twice. Very restrictive conditions are required to ensure that two 
random partial determinations are consistent with each other. It will certainly 
not be appropriate to combine a group of belief functions by Dempster's rule if 
more than one of them is based on a permanent compatibility relation. 
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4.6. Conditioning and Combination 
I usually treat conditioning as a special case of combination, because I
consider the idea of combination more useful than the idea of conditioning for 
analyzing and sorting evidence. We can sort evidence more flexibly if we think 
of items of evidence as things to which we point--happenings or physical 
objects tagged with bits of knowledge or experience. It is more limiting to 
think of them as formal "propositions" or as subsets in frames already 
formulated. I agree with Smets, however, that conditioning can be put before 
combination in the formal theory or belief functions. 
One way to do this is to permit the compatibility relation to fall in such a 
way as to rule out certain elements of the probability space ft. If our witness 
says something we know to be false, for example, then this eliminates the 
possibility that she is reliable, and we will condition on the subset of fi 
consisting of the single element "unreliable," which will then have probability 
1. Since this element of fl is compatible with either element of O, our belief 
function on her evidence will be vacuous. 
In the example of the randomly coded message, we can similarly relax the 
assumption that w- I (M) is always a nonempty subset of O. It may sometimes 
be empty, indicating that co could not be the code Sally used. In this case, we 
must assume that Betty chooses the message L in a way that is not systemati- 
cally misleading. Then, by the general principles of Bayesian conditioning, we 
can condition P on {co [ o~-I(M) ~ Q}.  This leads to the belief function Bel 
given by 
P({co[o~-'(M) C_A}) 
Bel(A) = p({co lo_ , ( / )  * Q})  (2) 
This is the total probability of the codes that put the true answer in A, 
calculated using the conditional probabilities. 
How can we elaborate the condition that Betty chooses the message L in a 
way that is not systematically misleading? The simplest way, I think, is to 
assume that Betty chooses L without any knowledge of the set of codes that 
Sally uses, and certainly without any knowledge of the particular code co 0. If 
Betty selected L knowing COo, she might be able to select it so that Coo(L) 
would decode to false statements using most of the codes in ft. I f  Betty merely 
knew the probability space of codes (fi, P),  she might be able to choose L so 
as to make the normalization i (2) misleading. Of course, we can exclude only 
systematic bias. Betty might accidentally choose L in a way that misleads us 
on this particular occasion, but such is life. She will not make exactly the same 
mistake again. Since the compatibility relation is transitory, she will be sending 
a message about a different opic next time. 
In the case of randomly coded messages, Dempster's rule is easy to justify. 
We consider two probability spaces of codes, (fi i, P1 ) and (122, P2), that Sally 
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samples from independently. This is the same as sampling from the product 
space (ill × f12, P~ × P2)- On this particular occasion, Sally uses the two 
codes to send true messages about O from Betty and Jane. Sally uses the code 
~Oo~ that she draws from fll to encode a subset L I supplied by Betty, and she 
uses the code ~002 that she draws from f12 to encode a subset L 2 supplied by 
Jane. In effect, Sally sends a joint message L~ fq L 2, encoded with the joint 
code (~oOl, ~002). Since Betty's and Jane's choice of the messages i independ- 
ent of Sally's choice of the codes, the absence of systematic bias in choosing 
L 1 and L 2 extends to absence of bias in choosing the way they interact. For 
example, ~Oo~ does not influence Jane's choice of L 2. So we can say that 
L 1 N L 2 is chosen without systematic bias relative to (ill x fi2, P~ × P2), 
just as L l was chosen without systematic bias relative to (ill, Pl) and L 2 was 
chosen without systematic bias relative to (f12, P2). So we can apply (2) to 
L~ (3 L 2 and (ill × f12, P~ × P2), and this gives the product belief function 
Bel 1 ~) Bel2. 
The essential condition for Dempster's rule is independence b tween the two 
belief functions. This means independence of the background probability 
spaces and absence of any systematic bias in the way the compatibility relations 
interact. This condition is met easily in the case of the randomly coded 
messages. It may be more difficult to meet when one of the compatibility 
relations is permanent, for then the weight of the condition of absence of 
systematic bias must be borne fully by the transitory compatibility relation. We 
will see this in the three prisoners puzzle. 
4.7. The Three Prisoners Puzzle for Belief Functions 
The three prisoners puzzle and other similar puzzles for Bayesian condition- 
ing are puzzles for belief functions for two reasons: because Bayesian condi- 
tioning is a special case of Dempster's rule, and because it is sometimes 
thought hat belief functions, as a generalization that overcomes limitations of 
Bayesian theory, should be able to overcome the limitations of Bayesian 
conditioning. 
Is Bayesian conditioning a special case of Dempster's rule in only a formal 
mathematical sense, or is it a special case in the sense that the conditions under 
which it is legitimate (absence of bias in choice of information) can be 
subsumed under the conditions under which Dempster's rule is legitimate 
(independence, including absence of bias in the interaction of the compatibility 
relations)? 
The formal description of Bayesian conditioning as a special case of 
Dempster's rule is straightforward. We have two belief functions on a frame 
O. The first, Bel I, is additive. The second, Bel 2, puts mass 1 on the subset B 
of O. The product Bel I • Bel 2 gives the same degrees of belief as the 
conditional probability function Bell(. I B). In the case of the three prisoners 
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puzzle, 
O = {Art, Bob, Carl} 
The additive belief function Bel I gives degree of belief 1/3 to each element of 
O, and 
a = {Art, Bob} 
The product Bel~ • Bel 2 gives degree of belief I/2 to Art and degree of belief 
1/2 to Bob. 
As we learned in Section 2, there are two ways to legitimize conditioning on 
B. We can assume that B is learned in accordance with a protocol. Or, more 
generally, we can assume merely that B is chosen in some way that is not 
systematically biased. The guard in the three prisoners problem violates both 
assumptions by always choosing B to contain Art. In order to compare this 
with the conditions for Dempster's rule, we need to talk about he background 
probability spaces, (ill, Pi) and (il2, P2), and their compatibility relations 
with O, expressed by multivalued mappings l~l and r 2. And we have to 
interpret he multivalued mappings as transitory or permanent compatibility 
relations. 
Implicit in most comments on the puzzle (including the comments by Pearl 
and most of the discussants) is the assumption that rm represents a permanent 
compatibility relation. The probabilities 1/3 each for three prisoners represent 
the idea that someone chose at random which prisoner to execute, and 
repetition means repeating this random choice. So we simply make (ill, P1) a 
copy of (O, Bel 0, with I" I the identity mapping from fll to O. We can 
construct ( i2 ,  P2) by making i 2 consist of a single point, with probability 1; 
r 2 maps this single point to the subset B of O. Thus the choice of B defines 
the compatibility relation for the second item of evidence. Since B is chosen in 
a biased way, and since the first compatibility relation is fixed, the interaction 
of the compatibility relations is biased. Thus the bias that makes Bayesian 
conditioning illegitimate also makes Dempster's rule illegitimate. 
Most of the discussants, following Diaconis [24] and Pearl, present he 
problem in a different way. They enlarge the frame O so that it tells both who 
will be executed and what the guard will say, and they vacuously extend the 
probabilities of 1/3 each for who will be executed to a belief function on this 
larger frame. Then they ask whether we can condition this belief function on 
what the guard says. In this setting, we have a generalized protocol, in the 
sense that I discussed in Section 3. Does the fact that we are working with such 
a generalized protocol mean that conditioning is justified? Evidently not, if we 
retain the assumption that the compatibility relation is permanent. 
I do not agree with Wilson that the problem lies in the formal additivity of 
the belief function. It lies in the interpretation f that additivity. If we interpret 
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the additivity as a sign of a permanent compatibility relation (the victim is 
chosen at random), then we are essentially in the domain of probability 
bounds, and the discussion of Section 3 applies. But if the additivity is the 
accidental results of a transitory compatibility relation, then Dempster's rule 
might be appropriate. 
4.8. Ruspini's Probabilistic Model for Belief Functions 
Enrique H. Ruspini [25] has advanced a probabilistic model for belief 
functions that reduces the conditions for Dempster's rule to conventional 
formal independence conditions. As Ruspini, Lowrance, and Strat explain in 
their contribution to this discussion, belief function degrees of belief are both 
probabilities of provability and bounds on probabilities in this model. 
As the most thorough elaboration of the "probability of provability" idea 
(though it dates from 1987, before the idea was taken up by other authors), 
Ruspini's model merits attention. It casts valuable light on the theory of belief 
functions. But it sets up a superstructure of fictional and uninterpretable 
probabilities. A sorting out of which probabilities in the model are meaningful, 
in the sense of Matheron [14], will lead back, I believe, to the less elaborate 
approach I favor. 
To explain, I will put the canonical example of the witness of uncertain 
reliability into Ruspini's framework. I will first consider the single witness 
Betty telling me that a tree fell on my car, and then I will consider Betty and 
Sally both telling me something about whether a tree fell on my car. 
In order to put Betty into Ruspini's framework, we need, at the least, a 
probability distribution P for (_~, 0, _B), where _~ is a variable that tells 
whether Betty is reliable, with values in 
fi = { reliable, unreliable } 
0 is a variable that tells whether a tree fell on my car, with values in 
O = {did, didn't} 
and _B is a variable that tells what Betty says on the subject, with values in 
= {{did}, {didn't}, O} 
Here I am resorting to abbreviation. By 
0 = did 
m 
I mean that a tree did fall on my car. By 
_B = {did} 
I mean that Betty says a tree fell on my car. 
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In this setting, we have a supercompatibility relation--a compatibility 
relation between f~ and O for each possible value of the testimony _B. This 
supercompatibility relation can be expressed by the mapping F* from fl x 
to M given by 
F*(reliable, {did}) = {did} 
F*(reliable, {didn't}) = {didn't} 
F*(reliable, O) = O 
I'*(unreliable, {did}) = O 
F*(unreliable, {didn't}) = O 
F*(reliable, O) = 19 
In general, I'*(w, B) is the subset of O consisting of the values we would 
consider possible for _0 if we knew that 00 was Betty's reliability and B was 
her testimony. The distribution P must give probability 1 to a reliable Betty 
telling the truth: P(0 E r*(6o, B)) = 1. 
Suppose Betty says that the tree fell on my car. In other words, we observe 
B = {did}. We condition P on this observation. This gives the conditional 
distribution P(.I_B = {did}) for the still unknown variables ff and 0. Using 
this conditional distribution, we define a belief function Bel on O. For each 
subset A of O, we write 
Bel(A) = P(F*(_~, _B) ~ A I_B = {did}) 
= P(r*(_~, {did}) c_ A I_B = {did}) (3) 
This is the probability given by P( .  I _B = {did}) to the event hat A is proved 
by {did}, Betty's known testimony, together with if, her still unknown 
reliability. 
To see that Bel is a belief function, note that it depends only on the marginal 
of P(" I B = {did}) for w. Write Q for this marginal. Then define a multival- 
ued mapping r from fl to subsets of O by 
r ( ,o)  = r*(o~, {did}) 
This is the same multivalued mapping r we studied in Section 4.1, and (3) can 
be written 
Bel(A) = =_A} 
So Bel is the belief unction determined by the probability space (fl, Q) and the 
multivalued mapping 1 ~. If we write p for Q(reliable), then we get Bel(did) = p 
and Bel(didn't) = 0. So Bel differs from the belief function we obtained in 
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Section 4.1 only in that it is based on conditional probabilities for Betty's 
reliability given what she said rather than on frequencies for the reliability of 
similar witnesses. 
Now consider the problem of combining the testimony of Betty and Sally. 
Here we need a joint distribution P for (601, 602, 0, I i ,  82) , where 601 and _B I 
represent Betty's reliability and testimony, and ._~2 and _B E represent Sally's 
reliability and testimony. We can formulate a mapping F* to express the 
condition that a reliable Betty tells the truth, and an analogous mapping F* to 
express the condition that a reliable Sally tells the truth. The mapping I'* given 
by 
r * (w, ,  ~2, o, Bl, B2) = r* (~ l, B,) n rg'(~2, B2) 
then expresses both conditions. The marginal of P for (co I, _B~) conditioned on 
the observed value of _B~, together with F*, determines a belief function Bel 1 .
Similarly, the marginal for (co2, -B2) conditioned on the observed value of B 2 , 
together with F* 2, determines a belief function Bel 2. And the marginal for 
(~, -~a,  -Bl, -B2), conditioned on both observed values, together with F*, 
determines a belief function Bel. 
Under what conditions on P will Bel always be the result of combining Bel 1 
and Bel z by Dempster's rule, no matter what the observations are? The 
answer, as Ruspini et al. explain, is that the events 
r * (z , ,  -B,) = A, and F*(~2, _B2) = A z (4) 
must be independent with respect to P whenever their conjunction has positive 
probability. This comes down to saying that whether Betty is reliable and what 
she says is independent of whether Sally is reliable and what she says, within 
the constraint that they cannot both be reliable and say contradictory things. 
The simplest instance of (4) is 
r*(co,,-B,) = {did} is independent of I'*(co 2, --BE) = {did} 
which translates into the condition that 
Betty is reliable and says a tree fell on my car 
is independent of
Sally is reliable and says a tree fell on my car 
Notice that we do not say that 
r~'(¢°l, -B1) = {did} is independent of F~(602, -B2) = {didn't} 
because the events 
Betty is reliable and says a tree fell on my car 
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and 
Sally is reliable and says a tree didn't fall on my car 
cannot both happen; their conjunction has zero probability. 
Perhaps this is a reasonable probability model, provided we have evidence 
on which to base all the probabilities. But if we do have this evidence, and we 
do construct all the probabilities in the model, then Pearl's objection to the 
belief functions that we construct within the model is very cogent. Why should 
we be interested in the probability that A is provable rather than the 
probability that A is true? 
Ruspini et al. respond to this question with a scenario in which a statistician 
observes many instances of given "evidential conditions" and records only the 
frequency with which certain things were proved, not the frequency with 
which they were true. In the example of Betty, this would mean that the 
statistician observes many instances where a witness like Betty tells me a tree 
fell on my car, and records each time whether the witness was generally 
reliable, though not whether a tree fell on my car. Why should the statistician 
act this way? I think we must take the story as an extension of the canonical 
example. It is merely a story to which we compare our evidence. We compare 
our evidence to knowledge of frequencies that such a quirky statistician might 
have kept. 
Unfortunately, there is more to the story than the frequencies that the quirky 
statistician might have kept. There are also the frequencies he did not keep: the 
probabilities for 0 and B. On what evidence are these probabilities based? We 
have no evidence for them. Ruspini et al. express this by saying that we cannot 
measure them. I think it more appropriate to say that they do not exist and we 
cannot make them up. There is no reference class, no evidence, no repeatable 
experiment to which we can appeal to define them. They are purely fictional. 
This is why I do not want to say that Bel(A) is a lower bound for P(A). 
There is no P(A). 
When we bring these fictional probabilities for 0 and B into our model, they 
weaken the probabilities that do have an evidential basis. In the context of a 
model that includes probabilities for a tree falling on my car, how can I ignore 
them in assessing the probability of Betty's reliability given that she said a tree 
fell on my car? Should I suppose that 
Betty is reliable and says a tree fell on my car 
is independent of 
Sally is reliable and says a tree fell on my car 
when both are correlated with the event, also in the probability model, that a 
tree falls on my car? 
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To me, the constructive theory of belief functions is a way of using 
probability moderately--a way of making some probability judgments without 
creating so many fictional probabilities that speculation about them swamps 
what little evidence we have. This is why we should avoid Ruspini's model as 
a foundation for the constructive theory of belief functions. Yet the model 
deserves further theoretical ttention. Sorting out within it which probabilities 
are meaningful might be one way for us to gain more experience in the use of 
belief functions. 
4.9. Wilson's Justification of Dempster's Rule 
Nic Wilson, in his reply to my article, reviews very concisely the rationale 
for Dempster's rule based on the canonical examples of the witness or the 
randomly coded message. He is dissatisfied with this rationale, however, and 
he advances an alternative justification for Dempster's rule for simple support 
functions, based on judgments about conditional probabilities after hearing the 
witnesses. 
Wilson's rationale for Dempster's rule is very close to Ruspini's. Wilson 
does not posit probabilities directly for whether the tree fell on my car, but he 
makes the same a posteriori independence assumptions about the reliability of 
the witnesses as Ruspini makes. These a posteriori independence assumptions 
are, of course, satisfied by the joint probability distribution for the witnesses' 
reliability that underlies Dempster's rule, so the only difference between 
Wilson and me is whether it is more convincing to advance them directly or to 
justify them in terms of conditioning a single initial judgment of independence. 
I prefer conditioning a single initial judgment of independence because this 
allows a frequency interpretation farther into the story and because it mini- 
mizes the use of the slippery idea of conditional probability. Because condi- 
tional independence is so slippery (in the absence of a protocol), we can find 
plausible both Wilson's a posteriori ndependence and opposite judgments 
advanced by others (e.g., Freeling and Sahlin [26]). 
4.10. Smets's Escape from Probability 
Philippe Smets ao, ocates the complete avoidance of probability in the 
interpretation f belief functions. He prefers that belief functions tand on their 
own.  
The theory of belief functions can certainly stand on its own as a mathemati- 
cal theory. Here are certain axioms and rules; here are their consequences. In 
order to use the theory, however, we need something more. At the very least, 
we need canonical examples with which to compare and calibrate actual 
evidence. Ideally, these canonical examples hould motivate the axioms and 
rules. 
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My 1976 book suggested such canonical examples for weights of evidence, 
which are related logarithmically to the degrees of belief for simple support 
functions, and which therefore combine additively. We combine different items 
of evidence by adding weights that score their strength. We need a scale of 
measurement for these weights, and I suggested using statistical likelihoods to 
provide this scale. (Pearl starts to rediscover this idea in Section 4 of his 
article.) 
The canonical examples that I have emphasized in my articles since 1976 
have tied probability more directly to degrees of belief. My motivation for 
doing this was to allow belief functions more direct access to frequency 
evidence and to allow belief functions to use people's willingness to compare 
nonfrequency evidence to frequency evidence. 
I am uncertain about Smets's attitude toward canonical examples. In prac- 
tice, he sometimes uses frequencies in this role. He appeals to "Hacking's 
principle" to justify equating his degrees of belief with frequencies when 
frequencies are known, and this creates a standard that can be used to calibrate 
nonfrequency evidence. But he stops short of using such examples to justify the 
axioms and rules of the theory. He does not, for example, provide any 
justification of the normalization i volved in Dempster's rules of conditioning 
and combination. As I explained earlier, this normalization is explained by an 
appeal to Bayesian conditioning when we use the witness of uncertain reliabil- 
ity or the randomly coded message as our canonical examples. It also comes 
out in the wash when we use weights of evidence; here it is part of a 
convenient translation of the weights of evidence to an alternative numerical 
scale. 
While commenting on Smets's views of normalization, I want to deny that I 
make a closed-world assumption. The choice between an open world and a 
closed world does not enter into the general theory of belief functions; it is a 
choice we make when we set up the frame of discernment O for a particular 
problem. By including an element in O that is not impugned by any of our 
items of evidence, we forestall any normalization. 
I would also like to register my disagreement with the idea that belief 
functions should be additive in order to reach a "pignistic level" where 
decisions can be made. I agree with Ruspini et al. that we should not pretend to 
knowledge or evidence we do not have simply to make our decision making 
look tidier. 
4.11. Asymptotics for Belief Functions 
I share Larry Wasserman's interest in developing an asymptotic theory for 
belief functions, not because this would bring belief functions closer to 
Bayesian theory, but because it would root belief functions more firmly in a 
tradition much older and deeper than Bayesian theory. 
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The belief function methods that have been proposed for statistical inference 
tend to share the asymptotic properties of Bayesian and sampling theory 
methods for the same problems. If we simply use a consonant belief function 
with plausibilities of singletons proportional to the joint likelihood of the 
observations, then the expected concentration of the likelihood on the correct 
parameter value will imply degrees of belief approaching 1 for neighborhoods 
of that value. Alternatively, if we translate individual observations into belief 
functions using some other method that still makes the plausibilities of single- 
tons proportional to the likelihoods, and then combine these belief functions by 
Dempster's rule, then the result will agree asymptotically with a Bayesian 
analysis. 
As I have already argued, however, this familiar setting is not the most 
appropriate for belief functions. I would be more interested in asymptotic 
results for the situation where the accumulation of evidence involves the 
investigation of more and more related questions, with a steady enlargement of
the frame. There should be conditions of unbiasedness and haphazardness on 
the distribution of compatibility relations (we need some chaos here, not 
necessarily a probability distribution) and on the selection of propositions 
whose degree of belief we examine, which would enable us to relate the 
degrees of belief for these propositions to the frequency with which they are 
true. 
5. MONTE CARLO IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMPSTER'S RULE 
I do not fully share Wilson's enthusiasm for Monte Carlo implementation f 
Dempster's rule. My conversations with Augustine Kong, who has explored 
extensively the use of Monte Carlo algorithms in Bayesian and belief function 
networks, suggest that the method is useful but that it is not a panacea. 
As Wilson points out, the computational cost of the Monte Carlo implemen- 
tation tends to be proportional to the frame size. But it is also proportional to 
r ,  where log r is the weight of conflict. Wilson assumes that r is bounded, 
and hence he treats it as a constant. In the examples that have interested me, 
however, the weight of conflict grows with the size of the problem and 
becomes the limiting factor in the usefulness of the Monte Carlo approach. 
When the weight of conflict is large, the Monte Carlo approach is infeasible, 
because only a tiny fraction of the trials give usable information. 
Wilson argues that an extremely high weight of conflict will not occur if the 
analysis is valid. If evidence is too conflicting, we should not be trying to 
combine it. I agree that too high a weight of conflict signals problems, but 
what is too high is relative. As we combine more and more items of evidence, 
we would expect a steady multiplicative increase in r.  Typically, we get large 
frames because we are increasing the number of items of evidence. As I 
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explain in Section 8 of my review article, new items of evidence generally 
involve collateral questions that must be brought into the frame, especially if 
we are trying to sort our evidence into independent items. Consequently, I 
associate an increase in frame size with an increase of the number of items of 
evidence and hence an increase in the weight of conflict. 
As Wilson points out, the Monte Carlo approach can be combined with 
propagation i a Markov tree. Locally in the tree, both the frame sizes and the 
weight of conflict will be lower, and hence the Monte Carlo approach will be 
more feasible. If the tree has large cliques or a large branching factor, 
however, even the local weight of conflict may make the Monte Carlo 
approach infeasible. 
Another way to broaden the usefulness of the Monte Carlo approach might 
be to combine it with Bayesian approximations when the weight of conflict is 
large. Often, though not always, large weights of conflict signal a concentra- 
tion of belief on disjoint subsets or even singletons. If we can recognize when 
this happens, then we may be able to reduce some aspects of the computation 
by working with the partitions formed by the disjoint subsets. 
6. APOLOGIES 
When I undertook to write a review article on belief functions, I feared that I
would overlook important work and make errors of attribution and interpreta- 
tion. I am grateful, therefore, that the article was accompanied by the articles 
of Pearl, Strat, Dubois and Prade, and Provan, which added a number of 
significant references to those that I had given. I am also grateful to the 
discussants for pointing out some of my errors. 
In response to the comments by Dubois and Prade, I would like to apologize 
for failing to absorb the probabilistic interpretation f their disjunctive analog 
of Dempster's rule (Dubois and Prade [27]) and for overlooking Smets's 
contribution in this area (Smets [28]) as well as his contribution with Kennes 
(Kermes and Smets [29]) on the fast M/Sbius transform. 
There are numerous recent contributions that none of us have mentioned. 
Among these, I would like to call attention to Mary McLeish's work on belief 
functions and nonmonotonic logic [30] and to Jiirg Kohlas's work on the 
mathematical foundations for belief functions on infinite spaces [31]. 
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